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Abstract. Alexander von Humboldt provides a point of reference for 
questions that arise when reflecting on the papers in this special 
issue on “Experiencing the Global Environment,” for he aimed to 
integrate local and global experience and qualitative and 
quantitative observation in his conceptions of physiognomy and of 
instruments. What are we to understand by direct experience? How 
do we draw the limits of our senses, whether in the larger world or 
internally? Does recent scholarly interest in distributed cognition 
illuminate the distributed experience of global phenomena obtained 
through mapping? How do our concepts shape our experience, 
whether local or global? Finally, do recent trends in the sciences, 
emphasizing complexity and contingency, tend to make traditional 
tensions between local and global priorities and between qualitative
and quantitative description less relevant? Humboldt would have 
thought so.
Key Words: Alexander von Humboldt, physiognomy, direct 
experience, distributed cognition, complexity.
1 This is the afterword for the SHPS special issue Experiencing the 
Global Environment (Volume 70, August 2018).
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In 1827 Alexander von Humboldt returned to Berlin on the 
order of Friedrich Wilhelm III to take up his official position as 
Chamberlain to the king. He had spent many years in Paris 
preparing and publishing the great volumes that documented his 
explorations of the Americas with Aimé Bonpland in 1799-1804. The 
famous lectures that he presented to academics and the public in 
1827-1828 marked his arrival and projected the content of the most 
widely read scientific book in Germany in the 19th century: Kosmos: 
Entwurf einer physischen Weltbeschreibung. In this as in many 
related works, Humboldt produced the canonical exploration of the 
relation of sensory perception to global phenomena. What makes 
Humboldt’s perspective especially interesting is that he refused the 
dichotomies of local and global, qualitative and quantitative, 
aesthetic and rational, aiming not simply for complementarity but 
for real integration. That integration depended on two characteristic 
conceptions, of physiognomy and of instruments.
Humboldt borrowed physiognomy from Johann Kaspar 
Lavater’s presentation of the view that character traits were 
inscribed in the facial features of individuals. The famous 
illustrations for Lavater’s Physiognomische Fragmente zur 
Beförderung der Menschenkenntnis und Menschenliebe were done 
by Humboldt’s drawing instructor, Daniel Chodowiecki, who became 
director of the Academy of Arts in Berlin. Exemplary in Humboldt’s 
usage are his physiognomic projections of landscapes, as vertical 
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cuts running across broad regions in South America and Mexico. 
Such a global silhouette, showing mountains, plateaus, 
temperatures, and “everything that belongs to the structure of the 
globe,” was not merely a physical form but stood “in intimate 
connection with the advances of the population and with the well-
being of the inhabitants.”2 Even more revealing was the 
“physiognomy of plants,” obtained by inscribing characteristic 
species on the vertical projections and correlating them with 
elevation, pressure, temperature, rainfall, and other variable 
parameters. From such pictures Humboldt identified eighteen main 
forms of plants in different climate zones over the surface of the 
earth, from sea level to high mountains and from the tropics to 
arctic regions.3 In physiognomy Humboldt aimed to integrate local 
2 Alexander von Humboldt, Essai politique sur le royaume de la 
Nouvelle-Espagne. Paris: Schoell, 1808–14), in Hanno Beck (ed.), 
Alexander von Humboldt: Studienausgabe. 7 vols. (Darmstadt: 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1989–97), vol. 4, 119-120, with 
plates from Humboldt’s Atlas géographique et physique du royaume
de la nouvelle-espagne. For the perspective here and below see M. 
Norton Wise, Aesthetics, Industry, and Science: Hermann von 
Helmholtz and the Berlin Physical Society (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2018), 176-178.
3 Humboldt, Alexander von, Ideen zu einer Physiognomik der 
Gewächse (1806), republished with extensive notes in Humboldt’s 
Ansichten der Natur (1808), 3rd ed., 1849; reprint in Humboldt: 
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variation with global structure, in the pictorial mode of a landscape 
architect or painter.
The second means of integration involved the role of 
instruments, which Humboldt carried with him through the Americas
on pack animals. A subsequent example will make the point. When 
Humboldt arrived back in Berlin he planned to set up a magnetic 
observatory that would form part of a worldwide network, making 
standardized observations with precision instruments. In formally 
announcing his plans, he identified the beginning of the “natural-
scientific civilization of the world” with new instruments developed 
in the seventeenth century. He did not, however, regard these 
instruments as mere extensions of existing human senses. Instead 
they were “new organs.”  As new sensory organs, they provided 
new means of perception, “new means to set humans 
(contemplating and knowing) in a more intimate contact with the 
external world: telescope, thermometer, barometer, pendulum 
clock, and a tool of more general purpose, the infinitesimal 
calculus.”4 Humboldt thus made it clear that the new instruments of 
measurement and analysis were simultaneously new instruments of 
sensibility. And his conception of instruments melds directly into 
Studienausgabe, vol. 5.
4 Humboldt, Alexander von, “Ueber die Mittel: Die Ergründung 
einiger Phänomene des tellurischen Magnetismus zu erleichtern,” 
Annalen der Physik, 91 (1829), 319–336, on 319. 
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that of physiognomy, for it was quantitative mapping that revealed 
the qualitative characteristics of global phenomena. 
This view of Humboldt’s science has been thoroughly 
developed in recent historical interpretations. Michael Dettelbach 
emphasizes the inseparability of qualitative and quantitative 
description. Marie Noelle-Bourget describes the interrelation of 
humans and instruments in Humboldt’s “Republic of Instruments.” 
And John Tresch shows how machines served as mediators between 
mind and nature while vitiating the antithesis of subjective and 
objective. In Humboldt’s work aesthetic judgment merged with 
rational analysis.5
Direct experience
5 Dettelbach, Michael, “The Face of Nature: Precise Measurement, 
Mapping, and Sensibility in the Work of Alexander von Humboldt,” 
Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical 
Sciences, 30 (1999), 473–504. Bourget, Marie-Noëlle, “La république
des instruments: Voyage, mesure et science de la nature chez 
Alexandre de Humboldt,” in Etienne Francois, et. al. (eds.), Marianne
Germania: Deutsch-Französischer Kulturtransfer im europäischen 
Kontext 1789–1914 (Leipzig: Leipzig Universität Verlag, 1998), 405–
36. Tresch, John, The Romantic Machine: Utopian Science and 
Technology after Napoleon (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2012), ch. 3.
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Nearly all of the papers in this volume wrestle with how 
practitioners of modern science have engaged with the issues that 
Humboldt sought to address, of whether and how we can 
experience the global. A constantly recurring question is the 
meaning of experience, and even more pointedly of “direct” 
experience. What was “direct”? To many (maybe most) 
investigators it seems to have meant direct perception via our 
sensory organs. But that was a contested view. Etienne Benson 
surveys the attempts in the 1980s of some geomorphologists to 
renarrate their discipline, extending it to include “mega-
geomorphology,” which investigated land forms over large regions 
of the earth’s surface using remote-sensing technologies from 
space. They would renarrate their discipline to make remote sensing
an accepted part of what had been a discipline based on direct 
experience in the field. Among those promoting this “radical” 
reconception was Robert Sharp, who argued that remote sensing 
was fieldwork, that it mattered not whether the instruments 
regularly used by geomorphologists for observations at a distance 
were carried by hand, by donkey, or by spacecraft. 
But what makes this view radical? Humboldt, conceiving 
instruments as essentially new sensory organs, would have 
regarded remote sensing as simply a new means of capturing the 
physiognomy of the globe and a new feature of natural-scientific 
civilization. Sharp, who regarded himself as a traditional field 
geologist, was “radical” in the eyes of those for whom fieldwork 
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meant on-the-ground examination of relatively small portions of the 
earth’s surface, coupled with quantitative description and 
mathematical modeling. Thus, Benson shows us that what counted 
as “direct experience” and “fieldwork” among most 
geomorphologists was loaded with disciplinary tradition and 
territoriality. To open up their identities to new methods of global 
experience would require reframing the discipline as a whole, which 
the mega-geomorphologists attempted with only limited success.
The limits of “us”
If the question of what counts as direct sometimes refers 
immediately to disciplinary identities, it evokes even more generally
the view that direct experience is sensory experience and extends 
no further than the sensory organs of our bodies. It has often been 
regarded as “embodied experience,” as expressed in several papers
in this issue. Once again Humboldt’s conception of new instruments 
as new sensory organs flags the problem. Where do “we” end? Are 
the multiple devices that we employ to supplement our sensations 
still part of us? For example, does the sensor that I use to detect my
heart rate and transmit it to my smart phone, replacing my finger on
an artery, count as providing a direct sensory reading? 
Perhaps William Carpenter had something like this conundrum
in mind when, as described by Lino Camprubi, he distinguished 
“mechanical” from “inferential” evidence for deep currents in the 
Mediterranean. “Mechanical” referred to evidence obtained from the
7
drag on a sail suspended deep in the sea while “inferential” referred
to the testimony of comparative temperature and salinity 
measurements from other regions of the oceans. For Carpenter, as a
physiologist who understood the human body in mechanical terms 
and defended the view that all of our mental functions except 
volition are those of an automaton, it would have been hard to 
differentiate conceptually between the mechanical connection of a 
finger to the artery it (almost) touches and the mechanical 
connection of that same finger to an undersea sail communicating 
through hundreds of meters of rope. The term “mechanical” itself, 
understood as a mechanical linkage, made the evidence “direct,” 
independent of distance to the sail. The term “inferential,” however,
read as “indirect,” depended on somehow breaking this mechanical 
connection through the body, whether because the measuring 
instruments lowered in the sea did not sense current or because the
judgment involved depended on information assembled from 
elsewhere. But the inferences, on Carpenter’s automaton theory, 
would have been just as mechanical as the evidence of the sail. 
This example may help to make clear that the notion of direct 
sensory experience depends on demarcating a boundary between 
the sensing body and the environment it senses. This boundary is of
course becoming ever more diffuse and permeable as contemporary
physiology continues to show how “we” extend into our 
environment. The explosion of research on the microbiome is a 
telling example, for it shows the degree to which the colonies of 
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bacteria that inhabit our internal bodies and our external 
environment are in fact constitutive of us, of our mental states as 
well as our health and disease. To an increasing degree “we” can be
identified and located on a world map by our microbiome, indicating
whether we are urban or rural, gardeners or not, living in Africa or 
the Arctic. In this sense we are constantly and directly experiencing 
the global world. For we are it.
Angela Creager takes up this topic at length in her article on 
our bodies as chemical sensors, where the issue is the relation 
between our internal and our external environments. It may be that 
we do not have direct experience of the chemicals that inhabit our 
bodies as a result of environmental exposure, in that we may have 
no conscious sensory experience of them. But the instruments that 
detect chemicals in our blood and urine and establish their genetic 
effects provide as exquisitely sensitive a probe of their presence as 
any other Humboldtian organ of experience. To argue that this is not
direct experience of our internal states would seem somehow 
bizarre. Instead, the highly contested status of such measurements 
revolves around how directly they can establish the source of 
contamination, its time frame, and its consequences for health and 
disease. Who should have oversight and who should bear 
responsibility have been even more contentious. To explore the 
history of these issues, as Creager shows, is to unfurl a whole world 
of regulatory struggles, profits, and justice beneath the question of 
experiencing the global environment.
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Distributed cognition and distributed experience
Our thorough embeddedness in our environment has received
even broader significance in recent work on “distributed cognition.” 
While cognition has traditionally been located in the brains of 
individuals, distributed cognition locates it also in our interactions 
with other people, with artefacts and tools, and with the 
environment generally. Tools provide the most obvious case, such 
as the use of a simple calculator to take over functions that our 
brains previously performed. But of course, as Humboldt would say, 
such tools are not mere extensions of our senses and mental 
capacities, they are new organs of cognition, as is apparent in our 
use of computers for previously unimaginable feats of perceiving 
and reasoning. But even more interesting are our interdependencies
with other people. The classic analysis was given by Edwin Hutchins 
in a study of the people, skills, and instruments involved in 
navigating a large ship.6 A prominent feature is the continual 
transformation of representations by different actors using different 
tools and the coordination between them. No individual ever 
possesses the knowledge embodied in the activities of the team. It 
is instead distributed through the dynamics of the system and may 
best be thought of as an emergent property of that system. 
6 Hutchins, Edwin, Cognition in the Wild (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1995).
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Some scholars in science studies have adopted this 
perspective in seeking to interrelate anthropological and 
philosophical understanding of cognition. One such study suggests a
framework for understanding how the visualization of information 
functions in cognition.7 Like Hutchins on navigation it stresses 
representation and interaction as dynamic processes. Importantly, a
visual representation performs cognitive functions, which are 
embodied in it and become part of the cognition of others who make
use of it. But different visualizations perform different cognitive 
functions, which are more or less effective in communication. Even 
the simplest interaction involving a visualization of information thus 
becomes a social matter, invoking cultural habits and values that 
may or may not be shared.
This perspective may be helpful in thinking about what Fa-Ti 
Fan and Camprubi and Lehmann, in reference to the distribution of 
sensors over the globe, call “distributed experience.” The typical 
role of such sensors in the environmental sciences is to provide a 
mapping of data that gives visual access to otherwise invisible 
patterns (temperature, rainfall, earthquake activity, geomorphology,
etc.). A canonical example of such a distribution of experience is 
Humboldt’s 1817 map of isothermal lines: curves of constant annual
7 Liu, Zhicheng, Nancy J. Nersessian, and John T. Stasko, “Distributed
Cognition as a Theoretical Framework for Information Visualization,”
IEEE Transactions on Visualization and Computer Graphics, 14 (6), 
(2008), 1173-1180. 
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mean temperature, derived from data acquired from scattered 
observing stations and mapped over the northern hemisphere for 
both geographical position and elevation.8 This mapping was part of 
Humboldt’s attempt to define the distribution of climatic zones over 
the earth as a critical part of the physiognomy of nature. Proponents
of distributed cognition would observe that much of the cognition 
concerning climate zones was embodied in the visual representation
itself and was a product of coordination and distribution of local 
experience over observers, providing a new form of direct global 
experience.
Philipp Lehmann, however, shows how problematic this aim 
for distributed experience and cognition could become in attempts 
of the German Colonial Office in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century to establish standardized meteorological 
recording stations in German East Africa that could produce data 
suitable for regional mapping and comparative evaluation of 
agricultural opportunities. Establishing such local consistency turned
out to be intractable, partly because of practical problems of 
instruments and observation but also because standardization itself 
8 Humboldt, Alexander von, “Des lignes isotherme et de la 
distribution de la chaleur sur le globe,” Mémoires de physique et de 
chimie de la Société d’ Arcueil, 3 (1817), 462–602; the chart 
appeared only in a separate publication with the same title (Paris: 
Perronneau, 1817); German in Beck, Humboldt: Studienausgabe, 
6:18–97 (chart on 19).
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effaced qualitative judgments and the values associated with them 
by locally oriented practitioners. They included indigenous people 
and colonial agents but also some professional meteorologists who 
prioritized sensory experience and aesthetic judgment over 
instrument readings.9 This dichotomizing of qualitative and 
quantitative values, as Lehmann shows, derailed the global program
and any Humboldtian ambitions for integration.
 Jeremy Vetter similarly problematizes the goal of bridging the 
gap between local and global knowledge for field scientists at the 
U.S. Bureau of Biological Survey at about the same time. Following 
Humboldt, C. H. Merriam and Vernon Bailey sought to integrate local
field knowledge into mappings of “life zones” of plants and animals 
over the country, taking temperature distribution as the most 
fundamental variable. Their projects, however, ran up against two 
basic objections: much of the local knowledge of life forms could not
be integrated into their global pictures; and temperature alone 
provided an inadequate basis for identifying life zones. Such 
tensions between micro-level complexity and macro-level over-
simplification seem to be endemic to many of the case studies 
discussed in this special issue. 
Concepts and experience
9 Interestingly, one of these meteorologists was Karl Wilhelm Dove, 
grandson of Heinrich Wilhelm Dove, one of Humboldt’s main 
collaborators in Berlin on magnetic observations, who is best known 
for his own global meteorological mappings. Maull, Otto, “Karl 
Wilhelm Dove,” Neue Deutsche Biographie, vol. 4 (Berlin: Duncker &
Humblot, 1959), 93.
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The topics of distributed cognition and distributed experience 
suggest a related issue that could use more explicit discussion. We 
experience the world through concepts. Humboldt was very much 
aware of that when he listed the infinitesimal calculus, along with 
material instruments like the thermometer, among the “new 
organs” that set humans in more intimate contact with the world. To
employ his friend Joseph Fourier’s differential equation for heat flow 
to represent and to understand the cooling earth made available an 
experience quite different from anything the senses alone provided. 
James Clerk Maxwell, even more explicitly, shared the satisfaction 
that many physicists found in being able to “feel” the sensory reality
of mathematical and quantitative expressions for physical concepts.
“They calculate the forces with which the heavenly bodies pull at 
one another and they feel their own muscles straining with the 
effort. To such men momentum, energy, mass are not mere abstract
expressions of the results of scientific inquiry. They are words of 
power, which stir their souls like the memories of childhood.”10 This 
embodiment of mathematical forms captures rather well the way in 
which concepts can affect our experience directly, and in a sensory 
way. If that is true for personal experience of the symbolic 
expression for momentum (mv), it is even more broadly significant 
for the distributed experience carried by isothermal lines, magnetic 
10 Maxwell, James Clerk, “Address to the Mathematical and Physical 
Sections of the British Association,” Report of the British Association
for the Advancement of Science, 40 (1870), 215-229, on 220.
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field lines, meteorological maps, and other representations of global
phenomena. It may be a serious mistake to separate out conceptual
from sensory experience. Certainly that conclusion would follow 
from the integration of individual minds with their environment as 
pursued under distributed cognition.
Fa-Ti Fan provides a cogent example of the significance of 
concepts for experience in his analysis of how Chinese 
seismologists, reflecting widespread sensibilities of ordinary people 
during the Cultural Revolution, conceived of an earthquake not 
simply as a geodynamical rupture but much more broadly as 
constituted, for example, by the behaviors of domestic and wild 
animals. It was “an amalgam of myriad micro- and macro-
environmental processes and sensory phenomena. It was the total 
sum of seismicity, chemistry, electromagnetism, sensory 
experiences, and observable phenomena . . . a cacophony of light, 
sound, smell, weather, water, and other environmental changes.” 
Their research strategies expressed this extensive meaning of the 
concept of an earthquake. Thus, monitoring animal behavior was 
monitoring earthquakes themselves, not simply using a biological 
instrument to detect earthquakes.
Strikingly different is Elena Aronova’s discussion of how 
animals came to be studied as potential seismic sensors in the US, 
more as a fortuitous accident than an intimate relation. For two case
studies in California she shows that biologists happened to get 
involved largely because the US Geological Survey was seeking 
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clients for its extensive collection of data from its global network of 
seismic stations. They offered funds to support innovative projects 
exploiting their data and they provided a publicity forum for related 
studies. Biological scientists interested for other reasons in circadian
rhythms, on the one hand, and in secretive studies supported by the
military of brain waves and operant conditioning, on the other hand,
found opportunities to advance their work. At the same time they 
maintained a critical distance from the Chinese studies, 
emphasizing the superior quantitative rigor and theoretical 
foundations of “Western scientific method” in comparison with the 
more descriptive and mass-based observational accounts emerging 
from China. Seen in comparative perspective, the articles by Fan 
and Aronova show how markedly our concept of an earthquake 
shapes not only what we take to be our experience of it but the way 
in which research is understood and motivated. 
Complexity and contingency
These two articles on earthquakes may also be seen to take 
us back to the problem of prioritizing local or global experience, 
micro-level complexity or macro-level simplicity. Chinese 
investigators respected the diversity of local experience while the 
Americans looked for standardized global variables. Similarly, 
traditional geomorphologists, with their methodological feet planted 
literally on the ground, had trouble accepting the remote sensing 
techniques for revealing global patterns promoted by mega-
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geomorphologists. The simplified “life zones” of leaders of the US 
Biological Survey offended nuanced local knowledge. Officials in the 
German Colonial Office, in their attempt to produce rationalized 
regional meteorological maps, ran roughshod over qualitative 
judgments valued in the colonies. Broadly speaking, those seeking 
global patterns in these cases were pursuing the traditionally 
dominant aim of scientific explanation, borrowed from physics, of 
unification and reduction under general principles or laws. Localists 
have instead stressed diversity and complexity. Historically, this 
disjunction has often taken the form of the natural sciences versus 
the human sciences, or the mathematical sciences versus natural 
historical sciences. And it has often revolved around the idea that 
lawlike explanation aims to eliminate contingency while descriptive 
understanding insists on its preservation. So it cannot be surprising 
to find that investigators in the field sciences have long struggled to
find their proper place in a fraught disciplinary terrain.
 The question arises, however, of whether these terms of 
tension are still quite relevant given recent trends in the sciences. 
Arguably those trends are deemphasizing deductions from laws 
while models and model systems increasingly occupy the center of 
investigative practice.11 That seems to be true not only in the 
environmental and biological sciences but in the sciences of 
11 Creager, Angela N.H., Elizabeth Lunbeck, and M. Norton Wise 
(eds.), Science without Laws: Model Systems, Cases, and Exemplary
Narratives (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007). 
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complexity that have become so prominent in physics and 
chemistry. Typical problem areas addressed by contemporary 
investigators include: the folding patterns of various proteins in 
varying environments; the relation of a particular hurricane to 
models of global warming; and the possible response of a particular 
individual to a specific drug whose general effects are known only 
on average for the population at large (personalized medicine). 
Learning to deal with complexity is perhaps the most pervasive 
desideratum of contemporary science. And dealing with complexity 
means dealing with contingency. Today that often involves running 
dynamic computer models, or simulations, which respond to tiny 
changes in parameters and to subtle instabilities, yielding results 
that mimic very local conditions but are not revealed by general 
laws or even rules. An impressive example is a recent 
transformation in the very concept of an ordinary snowflake. No 
longer a universal geometrical structure with six-fold symmetry, its 
description now requires a whole taxonomy of widely variable forms 
and subtle structures, each unique, which have been revealed by 
simulations, some of them previously unknown even in high-
resolution photomicrographs.12 
In our contemporary context, where computational strategies 
like this have become mundane and where—even more radically—
12 Gravner, Janko, and David Griffeath, “Modeling Snow-Crystal 
Growth: A Three-Dimensional Mesoscopic Approach,” Physical 
Review E, 79 (2009), 1-18. 
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artificial intelligence can learn the notoriously intuitive game of GO 
to defeat a world master, it will no longer suffice to choose either a 
local or global perspective or even quantitative over qualitative 
description. Techniques of visualization that interrelate those values
have become pervasive. A blossoming interest in the role of 
narrative in science seems to have a similar basis. So too does the 
movement in philosophy of science that prefers to focus on 
understanding rather than explanation.13 All of these developments 
point to something like an integration of physiognomy with precision
instruments. Humboldt was right!
13 Morgan Mary S., and M. Norton Wise (eds.), Narrative in Science, 
special issue, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science—Part A 
(2017). De Regt, Henk, Sabina Leonelli, and Kai Eigner (eds.), 
Scientific Understanding: Philosophical Perspectives (Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburg Press, 2009).
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